Delay of Gratification (DG) and Delay Discounting (DO) represent two indices of impulsive behavior often treated as though they represent equivalent or the same underlying processes. However, there are key differences between DG and DO procedures, and between certain research findings with each procedure, that suggest they are not equivalent. In the current article, evidence is presented to support the argument that DG and DO measure discrete, yet related, processes involved in delayrelated impulsive behavior. Also presented is a theoretical "feedback model" for the relation between DG and DO. In the model, it is proposed that the processes measured by DG are less cognitive and less learning-mediated than those measured by DO. However, as proposed, ability to sustain choices for delayed rewards (DG) is still represented in the choice processes measured by DO through an individual's learning history with DG types of situations; that is, the less a person is able to sustain choices for delayed rewards the more likely he or she will be to choose immediate rewards when given choices between larger delayed and smaller but more immediate options. The proposed model is consonant with observed consistencies and differences between DG and DO measures. From the proposed model, new research questions arise that would be lost in a continued conceptualization of DG and DO as equivalent measures.
also considered a model and measure of impulsive behavior, came from the field of behavior analysis and was originally based on nonhuman animal research. Human DD procedures have been developed to assess discounting behavior through initial choice preference between larger, delayed and smaller, nondelayed rewards. However, interpretations of DD findings have typically emphasized stimulus control (e.g., reward quality or delay lengths) instead of internal governing processes.
Given some of the impulsivity/delay-related similarities between these measures, it is not surprising that many researchers who publish w ithin the relevant literatures treat the two procedures as though they are equivalent (e.g. , Evenden & Ryan, 1996; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1995) ; or, in some instances, unambiguously assert that DG and DD should be regarded as measuring the same processes (Rachlin , 2000) . However, perhaps due in part to these procedures originating from different subdisciplines of psychology, DG and DD have not been studied in humans in a manner allowing direct comparisons between the two procedures. Therefore, very little actual data exist that specify the relation between these two models of impulsivity.
The thesis of the current article will be that DG and DD procedures measure discrete, yet related, aspects of impulsive behavior. As will be expanded on in following sections , DG and DD as measures of impulsivity are undoubtedly related; however, even without direct human laboratory comparisons, there are still "real world" circumstances under which these two procedures appear to reflect different underlying processes . These apparent differences may hold promise for a more complete and useful understanding of delay-related impulsive behavior.
The present article is intended to (a) serve as a review of the DG and DD assessment procedures and the processes believed to influence behavior during each procedure, (b) demonstrate through illustrative argument and example that DG and DD procedures measure different aspects of impulsive behavior, and (c) propose a theoretical framework for the relation between the different processes measured by DG and DD. From the proposed framework, novel research questions will emerge that should lead to a more complete analysis of delay-related impulsive behavior as defined by DG and DD.
Delay of Gratification and Delay Discounting

Delay of Gratification
As already described, the DG procedure is a measure of ability to sustain a choice for a delayed reward while a smaller immediate reward is continually available (e .g., Mischel, 1966) . In the most common DG procedure for children, primary reinforcers (cake, cookies, etc.) are normally used. In th is procedure, participants are seated at a table and presented with a choice between a larger or more preferred reward and a less preferred reward (e.g., Mischel & Baker, 1975; Mischel & Ebbesen , 1970) . Once participants choose the preferred option, they are instructed that they may have their preferred-choice item when the experimenter returns (the delay to which is not specified but is usually 15 to 20 min) or that they may have the less preferred option immediately or at any time during the delay period by ringing a bell that is on the table. If a participant rings the bell and receives the less preferred option, he or she can no longer receive the initially preferred delayed option. Interindividual differences in the length of time participants are able to wait before ringing the bell are taken to reflect individual differences in "self-control" or "willpower," with shorter delay periods indexing impulsivity.
In interpreting findings with this DG procedure, Mischel and colleagues have focused on behavioral inhibition on the part of the individual as the key determinant of interest (e.g. , Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel et aI., 1989) . Attributing causality to personal-agency variables, olr determinants within the organism, is consistent with personality theory, which emphasizes the analysis of interindividual differences in behavior independent of what might be considered stimulus control (e.g., Allport, 1961 ; Grant & Dweck, 1999; Mischel, 1990; . Though considerable DG research has explored the impact of situational manipulations on DG performance (see below), the underlying emphasis in interpreting the resultant effects has been on how these manipulations influence internal processes invoked by the DG procedure.
Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) have described a two-system model composed of "hot" and "cool" systems that characterize the underlying processes believed to determine performance in the DG procedure. Their model parallels in some ways the development and functioning of the human brain. The hot system in their model does not represent selfcontrol, but rather reflects pure, unmediated responding to environmental stimuli. They suggest that this system may be represented in the amygdala, which is functional at birth. Conversely, the cool system in their model represents the development of self-control, or the ability to inhibit responses by the hot system to salient environmental stimuli. They posit that this cool system may be represented in the hippocampus and frontallobe structures of the brain, which develop and become increasingly functional later in childhood.
The cool system in this model of impulsive behavior (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996; Mischel et aI., 1989; Sethi , Mischel, Aber, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 2000) represents an active process on the part of the individual to resist the "temptations" of the highly stimUlus-responsive hot system . Interindividual differences in ability to delay gratification, as measured by the DG procedure, constitute differences in cool-system functioning. Those individuals who have weak cool systems in terms of behavior inhibition are more impulsive and have a harder time willfully delaying gratification.
To support their model, Mischel and colle,agues cite a number of findings that conform to predictions derived from the model. For example, younger children are clearly less capable of delaying gratification than older children (e.g ., Mischel, 1966) , which is consistent with the maturational aspect of the model. Also, having the stimulus present during the delay period decreases ability to delay gratification compared to not having the stimulus present (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970) . This finding did not support the original hypothesis that having the stimulus present would lead to longer DG times rather than shorter times. It was hypothesized that having the stimulus present would serve to remind participants of what they were waiting for, thus making it easier to sustain the original choice. Finding that DG times were actually reduced by having the stimulus present suggests that there may have been properties of the stimulus (e.g., smell) that made it more difficult to resist when present. Interestingly, having a life-size color photograph of the stimulus instead of the actual stimulus did lead to DG times that were twice as long when compared to having a similar photograph of a neutral object (Mischel & Moore, 1973) . This finding supports the hypothesis of the earlier studies. Therefore, these photograph findings actually support the interpretation that DG times were shorter when the stimulus was present because of certain properties of the stimulus that made it more difficult to resist.
Another interesting finding involves the development of effective selfregulatory strategies (Mischel & Mischel, 1983) . When 4-year-old children are given the option of either obscuring or not obscuring the salient features of a stimulus during the delay period of the DG procedure, they typically choose to have the stimulus present, thus undermining their own efforts to delay gratification. However, 5-or 6-year-olds (and older children) more often choose to obscure the saliency of the stimulus during the delay period. It appears that children generally learn at a relatively early age that it is important to reduce the saliency of the stimulus in their efforts to delay gratification. In terms of individual differences in DG performance, research focusing on strategic attention deployment has shown that those children who spontaneously look away from the stimulus object or distract themselves in other ways have consistently longer delay times (e.g., Peake, Hebl, & Mischel, 2002; . Further, this type of attention deployment has even been observed through mother-toddler interactions in which the toddler distracts himself or herself during what are typically distressing separation periods from the mother. Even at such an early age, high levels of toddler attention diversion during separations from the mother have been found to be significantly related to DG performance later in preschool, with those who diverted attention more as a toddler delaying gratification longer in preschool (Sethi et aI. , 2000) . The ability to delay gratification in preschool also has been a remarkably robust predictor of later developmental outcomes. Longitudinal research using DG procedures has revealed predictive positive relations between a preschooler's ability to sustain a choice and later parental ratings during adolescence for academic and social competency, ability to deal with stress and frustration, and ability to pursue goals (Mischel , Shoda, & Peake, 1988) . Significant positive relations also have been found between an earlier ability to delay gratification and later verbal and quantitative SAT scores (Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990) . Longitudinal links have even been found between measures of DG in preschool and later measures of social and cognitive competencies and ability to self-regulate in early adulthood (Ayduk, Mendoza-Denton, Mischel , Downey, Peake, & Rodriguez, 2000) . These deve~opmental findings (i.e., that DG can be measured at such an early age and that these early measures are predictive of individual differences into early adulthood) suggest that an individual's capacity to sustain choices for delayed rewards may be a person characteristic (similar to other person characteristics like intelligence or activity level) that is influential in shaping long-range developmental outcomes (e.g. , Scarr, 1997) . In other words, the above research findings are consistent with the notion that ability to sustain choices for delayed consequences is an early-emerging personality characteristic foundational to subsequent developmental outcomes involving delayed consequences. As will be described in later sections, this characterization of DG processes as a developmentally foundational person characteristic will become important in conceptualizing the relation between the processes measured by DG and DD.
Delay Discounting ·
In contrast to DG procedures, DD procedures focus on initial-choice responses . These "commitment-choice" procedures typically present choices between larger delayed and smaller but more immediate reinforcers. Once a choice has been made, the participant is committed to it until the next trial-that is, there is no requirement to sustain a choice in that there is no opportunity to defect to the more immediate option after having made a choice for the delayed reward.
With DD research originating largely in the field of behavior analysis, which emphasizes stimulus control and overt behavior (e.g., Skinner, 1938) , DD researchers have historically avoided performance interpretations involving specific internal processes or person characteristics (e.g., Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2002; Rachlin, 2000) .
However, some researchers have begun to explore the underlying cognitive processes involved in DD (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003) , developmental topics related to DD (Green et aI., 1994; Reynolds, Karraker, Horn , & Richards, 2003) , and specific brain mechanisms implicated in DD performance (e.g., Cardinal, Pennicott, Sugathapala, Robbins, & Everitt, 2001; Wade , de Wit, & Richards, 2000) . These research efforts are more recent, and the fact that DD research has traditionally emphasized stimulus control and overt behavior and avoided the internal processes emphasized in most DG research has likely precluded a better understanding of the relation between DG and DD .
Procedures for assessing DD in humans usually take the form of hypothetical choices in which a participant is asked to choose between different monetary alternatives (one delayed and one immediate). More specifically, DD procedures are intended to assess the pattern of devaluation that occurs for an individual when a delay is added to the delivery of a particular reward. For example, consider two choice options: $5 or $10. All things being equal, it can be assumed that most individuals would choose the latter option . However, if a delay to the delivery of the $10 were added and incrementally increased, the $10 reward would begin to decrease in subjective value with increasing delay. Eventually, with the addition of a sufficient delay, the $10 would actually be of less subjective value than the alternative $5, causing a preference shift towards the smaller reward. For example, an individual may prefer $10 to $5 when the $10 is delayed by a week, but instead prefer the $5 when the $10 is delayed by a year. Individuals who shift their preference earlier (i.e. , with a shorter delay) are considered more impulsive.
By analyzing the points at which shifts in preference occur (also called indifference points) over multiple delays, the rate at which discounting occurs as a function of increasing delay can be quantified. Curves representing rate of discounting as a function of delayed rewards are best represented by a hyperbolic function (Mazur, 1987) ,
where Value represents the value of the delayed reward , A and 0 are the amount of reward and length of delay to its delivery, respectively; and k is a free parameter. The k parameter, which represents the steepness of an individual's discounting curve, serves as a parametric value operationalizing impulsivity, with higher k-values indicating greater discounting and impulsivity. Some authors also have included an exponent, which can yield a more precise fit to the data (e.g. , Green et aI., 1994) . Conceptually, the Hyperbolic Temporal Discounting Model -(e.g., Rachlin, 2000) is the model used to represent the processes measured by DD procedures. Generally, this model, as represented by Persons A and B in Figure 1 , illustrates the subjective values (the curves of the graphs) for smaller more immediate rewards relative to more delayed but larger rewards. From left to right, both graphs show the value of a given reward as the time to its attainment draws near. In both graphs, and for each reward , the model illustrates the observation that a reward increases in value shortly before it is to be obtained, but that it decreases in value (hyperbolically) when its delivery is more temporally distal.
More specifically from Figure 1 , to represents the point at which a particular smaller-sooner reward (e.g., $5) is to be given , whereas tE represents the point at which a larger more delayed reward (e.g., $10) may be obtained. The top panel of Figure 1 shows that Person A has a relatively steep discounting curve for the larger delayed reward, where k = 0.2 . For this individual, the functions for the two choice options cross before the availability of either option. Therefore, because of the crossover of the functions, if a choice were made at any time after the -----;.; preference reversal, at tc for example, the smaller-sooner reward would be preferred because of its close temporal proximity (compared to the delayed reward), even though in terms of absolute magnitude it is a less valuable option. However, if for the same individual a choice were made at t B , the larger-later reward would be preferred.
In the bottom panel of Figure 1 , no preference reversal occurs for Person B because of the less steep discounting curve for the larger more delayed reward, thus resulting in a smaller k-value of .02. Because this individual does not discount delayed rewards as steeply as Person A, at no time does the smaller-sooner reward become more valuable to that person than the larger-later one. By definition, Person B would be considered less impulsive than Person A.
Measurement procedures for this DD model typically aim to determine the steepness of the discount curve for the larger delayed reward as represented in Figure 1 by use of adjusting-amount or adjusting-delay procedures. In an adjusting-amount procedure, the tD parameter of Figure 1 is adjusted in two ways: amount of reward and the temporal distance between it and the larger reward. Figure 2 shows a schematic of indifference pOints for five different delays to receiving $10. To arrive at these indifference points, the participant would be asked a series of chOice-preference questions between $10 to be received after one of the specified delay intervals (e.g., 160 days) and a smaller adjusting amount of money available immediately. An indifference point in this instance is the smallest dollar amount a participant chooses to receive immediately instead of waiting for the delayed $10. For example, from Figure 2 , the indifference point for $1 0 in 160 days is $2 . This means that for this participant, receiving $10 in 160 days is of equal value to receiving $2 immediately. From plotting such indifference points over a series of delays, k-values from Equation 1 can be obtained.
Using discount functions as described above, relations have been found between higher k-values and excessive alcohol consumption (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998) , opioid dependence (Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997; Petry & Casarella, 1999) , and the clinical diagnoses of substance abuse and dependence, borderline personality disorder, and bipolar disorder (Allen , Moeller, Rhoades, & Cherek, 1998; Crean, deWit, & Richards, 2000) . Similarly, research with adult smokers has shown that those who smoke Cigarettes chronically discount delayed monetary rewards more on average than those who have never smoked (e.g., Mitchell, 1999; Reynolds, Richards, Horn, & Karraker, 2004) or those who have quit smoking (e.g. , Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999) . These findings point to the ecological validity of DD as a measure of impulsivity.
Specific Differences Between Delay of Gratification and Delay Discounting
Although a number of researchers discuss DG and DD findings as though they were derived from equivalent measures (see introduction), only Rachlin (2000) has attempted to articulate specifically how DG and DD measure the same behavioral processes. In that discussion, Rachlin contended that the DG procedure is actually measuring DD-a reduction in subjective value for delayed rewards purely as a function of the delay. This would mean that defections occur in the DG procedure because rewards decrease in subjective value the longer a participant waits. In this account, there is no allowance for the role of personal agency, or behavior inhibition, in what is measured during the DG procedure.
A critical aspect of the DG procedure that fits into this reasoning is that participants do not know how long they must wait before the experimenter returns and gives them the preferred reward (see earlier description of the DG procedure). It was suggested, given this condition, that the longer the experimenter is away, the longer still the participant believes he or she will have to wait before receiving the preferred reward. From this perspective, defections occur during the delay-to-reward period of the DG procedure because the delay to reward is perceived by a participant as becoming longer, which. leads to a delay-related reduction in subjective value for the initially preferred reward.
This account of the processes measured by the DG procedure may play a role in performance during such a procedure; however, it is inconsistent with a number of behavioral observations, some of which have already been discussed. We contend that these inconsistencies between DG and DD warrant further consideration and believe that they may hold promise for a more complete conceptualization of delay-related impulsive behavior. Some of these differences are outlined below:
1. Developmental onset differences. An interesting difference between the DD and DG procedures is that the ability to perform the procedures emerges at different ages. Mischel and Metzner (1962) conducted a study involving a DD procedure with children ranging in ages from 5 to 12 years old. They asked each child participant a single question about choice preference between smaller amounts of candy available immediately and larger amounts of candy that were delayed. The question was asked verbally, thus not requiring any reading ability; and all of the candy-choice options were visible during the procedure, therefore not requiring participants to consider hypothetical rewards. It was not until 9 to 10 years of age and older that participants started making choices in a manner reflecting sensitivity to the delays (i.e., logical discounting). Younger participants made no differentiation between different delays and therefore did not truly demonstrate discounting as a function of delay. The findings of this study are particularly important in comparing DG and DD because the procedure was similar to most DG procedures, except there was no requirement to sustain choices for delayed candy.
Similarly, with an "experiential" delay-discounting task developed by the authors (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004) , which involves multiple choice trials with actual delays (ranging from 0 to 60 seconds) and nickels for reinforcers , children younger than 8 or 9 years of age have not been able to perform the procedure in a manner reflecting discounting, or a sensitivity to different delays. However, 9-year-old and older children demonstrated discounting as a function of delay and showed expected age differences in k-values between 9-and 12-year-olds (Reynolds, Schiffbauer, Richards, & Karraker, 2003; Reynolds, Schiffbauer, Swenson , & Karraker, 2001) .
In that younger children do not consistently demonstrate delay discounting in a manner similar to older children or adults , it seems likely that the choice behaviors measured by DD procedures require participants to have a certain level of cognitive function ing to evaluate contingencies associated with the choice options, which younger children may not have. One possible developmental explanation for this agerelated difficulty in discounting may come from the cognitive-development literature. Cognitively, children develop what are considered concreteoperational abilities between 7 and 11 years of age (e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; Lutz & Sternberg , 1999) . The ages at which concreteoperational thinking emerges have been shown to vary, with younger children demonstrating some concrete-operational-like abilities (e.g. , Pears & Bryant, 1990; Rogoff, 1990 ). Yet a number of researchers hold that recent findings with younger children neglect certain aspects of Piaget's procedures and therefore do not de-validate Piaget's accounts (e.g., Chapman, 1988; Smith, 1982) . Concrete-operational thinking is characterized by a child's increased ability to perform internalized mental manipulations with non hypothetical, concrete subject matters. For example, prior to concrete-operational thinking, children are incapable of the mental operations required to take the perspective of another person or to understand that the volume of a substance may stay constant even if the shape of the substance changes. Concrete-operational thinking also involves more mature spatial operations, including the comprehension of distance, time, velocity, and space. In relation to DD procedures, it is possible younger children who have not yet achieved concreteoperational thinking, especially related to the perception of time, may have trouble conceptualizing the temporally related contingencies associated with DD choice options, therefore leading to a general insensitivity to different delay lengths in DD procedures.
However, children are able to perform the DG procedure as early as 3 1 /2 to 4 years of age in a manner predictive of long-range developmental outcomes (e.g., Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972; Mischel et aI., 1989) . With these age differences in measurement feasibility of DG and DD, it seems unlikely that the two procedures are measuring the exact same processes, and it seems even less likely that they both reflect the lateremerging processes measured by DD procedures. When compared to DG from a developmental perspective, the DO procedure appears to include the assessment of more mature cognitive processes than DG and is therefore, to some extent, measuring something different from what is measured by DG.
2. ''Real-world'' situations. As DG and DD are currently measured , it appears that they both hold ecological validity to real-world ci rcumstances regarding behavior inhibition and choice. However, each is likely applicable to different aspects of such situations. In other words, it is unlikely that under more ecologically valid conditions, as opposed to laboratory conditions, that the processes underlying either DG or DO alone determine delay-related impulsive behavior entirely. For example, a person who is trying to lose weight by restricting caloric intake is required to (a) make the initial choice to lose weight and (b) resist eating high calorie foods that are frequently available. Personally evaluating the relevant contingencies to make the initial choice to lose weight by restricting caloric intake is obviously an important factor in actually losing weight, which would perhaps reflect the choioe behaviors measured by DD procedures. However, as time goes by, and especially if the person does not initially see favorable results, he or she is required to sustain that choice by resisting the temptation to eat high calorie foods that are often immediately available (e.g., in the refrigerator at home or vending machines at work). In this example, the ability to sustain an earlier choice to lose weight clearly requires the ability to inhibit defecting to immediately available options , which would ultimately lessen the likelihood that weight would be lost. A similar example is the recovering alcoholic who arrives at a party and says "no" to the offer of an alcoholic beverage. This individual must not only say "no" to a drink upon arrival but also must sustain the choice of abstinence by continuing to say "no" to immediately available drinks while at the party.
These examples illustrate the importance of being able to sustain a choice for a preferred, but delayed, reward . They do not fit conceptually with the idea that the entire underlying process driving behavior in such situations is the delay (or a perception of increasing delay, as described above) either to losing weight or to maintaining abstinence from alcohol. This is apparent in that the individuals described in the examples should not be under the impression that the longer high-calorie foods are successfully avoided or the longer drinks are declined while at the party will lead to even longer delays before the desired outcomes are obtained (i.e., weight loss or abstinence from alcohol while at the party). Rather, these examples suggest that perhaps certain features of the immediate stimuli (i.e. , high-calorie foods or alcohol) are tempting and may require behavior inhibition on the part of the individual, as appears to be measured in the DG procedure. More generally, these examples highlight the likelihood that choice preference or initial value (as emphasized in DD measures) and ability to sustain a choice (as emphasized in DG measures) may represent different aspects of delayrelated impulsive behavior relevant to different contextual conditions.
Nonhuman-animal research comparing DG and DO.
A recent study (Reynolds, de Wit, & Richards, 2002 ) compared a DG procedure and a DD procedure developed for rats. In the DG procedure, the rats made multiple choices between a delayed larger reward and an immediate adjusting (usually smaller) reward. During the delay-to-reward period following responses to the delayed option, a rat could defect to the smaller immediate option and receive that reward immediately but then would no longer receive the delayed larger option for that trial. For the DD animals, the procedure was the same except that there was no opportunity to defect during the delay-to-reward periods. For both DG and the DD procedures, responses made to the immediate adjusting option during the delay-to-reward periods were recorded, even though such defection-like responses were not reinforced in the DD procedure. For the DD procedure, only the first defection-like response was recorded for a specific choice trial , which controlled for possible differences in number of opportunities to defect between the procedures. Results showed that the DG rats made significantly fewer defection responses than the DD rats made defection-like responses. This find ing showed that behavior inhibition was an aspect of behavior summarized by the DG procedure but not by the DD procedure. These nonhuman animal findings point to DG and DD measuring different aspects of impulsive behavior-behavior inhibition versus choice behavior, respectively. Using similar procedures to measure DG and DD in rats , comparisons also were made to determine the effects of serotonin (5HT) lesions on each (Richards, Chock, & de Wit, 1998) . It was found that only the DG group was impaired by the 5HT lesion. The increase in impulsive behavior in the DG procedure (and the absence of an increase in the DD procedure) after serotonin (5HT) lesions indicates that the requirement of sustaining a choice for a delayed alternative may be an important determinant of impulsive behavior in some types of situations-independent of choice behavior. In a subsequent study, which involved a different type of DD procedure and no DG comparison procedure, there was some disruption from serotonin (5HT) lesions on task performance (Mobini, Chiang, Ho, Bradshaw, & Szabadi, 2000) . However, this latter study did not provide a comparison for lesion effects between DD and DG procedures; therefore, it cannot be known to what extent animals in a DG procedure would have been affected by these same lesions. The nonhuman animal data that do compare DG and DD procedures generally suggest these procedures measure different aspects of impulsive behavior. This research also suggests different underlying neural mechanisms between the procedures, with a greater role of 5HT in DG.
4. Development of strategies. As described earlier, certain findings with the DG procedure are not consistent with the notion that the chief behavioral determinant in the DG procedure is a perception of increasing delay (Rachlin, 2000) . That children have longer DG times when a stimulus is not present (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970) , and that they also develop the strategy of obscuring the saliency of a stimulus in efforts to improve DG performance (Mischel & Mischel, 1983) , does not fit with a purely "delay-driven hypothesis" of the underlying processes measured by DG. As already described, however, these findings do support the notion that DG assesses the ability to resist (or inhibit responding to) the temptation of a salient, immediately available stimulus.
Taken together, these points of apparent difference between DG and DD suggest that (a) ability to delay gratification may be an earlier emerging, more foundational aspect of impulsive behavior when compared to the processes measured by DD, (b) the processes measured by DG and DD may relate to different aspects of ecologically valid, delay-related situations, and (c) some preliminary research suggests that DG and DD procedures measure behaviors mediated by different underlying neural mechanisms. The remainder of this article will focus on the ways in which DG and DD may be related.
A Unifying Feedback Model of Delay-Related Impulsive Behavior As described in previous sections, DG and DD appear to reflect somewhat different aspects of impulsive behavior, with DG measuring behavior inhibition and DD measuring choice preference. Choice preference, when compared to behavior inhibition , is suggested to reflect a higher-order cognitive process involving the subjective evaluation of a number of contingency factors. Comparatively, behavior inhibition is a less cognitive, less evaluative, and a less learning-mediated process. In the present argument, behavior inhibition (Le., DG) is put forward as the more basic underlying process that ultimately becomes incorporated into one's more subjective processes involving value and choice preference (Le., DD). From left to right, there are three main components to this depicted Feedback Model: DO processes, DG processes, and feedback learning processes. In this depicted relation between DO and DG , these two processes are considered discrete; however, they are still related (and should be correlated) through individual experiences in DG types of situations becoming incorporated through learning processes into one's choice behaviors measu red by DO.
(ISO) and a long-delay option (LO). Choice in this conceptualization would be what is characterized by 00 procedures. Actual choice preference for, or subjective value for, either the ISO or LO options would be influenced by a number of personal factors. Among these would be the perceived magnitude or quality difference between the choice options, perception of delay length, perceived differential probabilities of actually receiving the ISO or LO options and, as suggested above, personal history with ability to sustain choices for LO options. As diagramed in Figure 3 , if a choice is made for the LO option , the situation then likely becomes one involving ability to sustain that LD choice, because most choices involving delayed benefits also will involve regular opportunities for defection. From a discounting perspective it could also be argued that ability to sustain a choice during this period might instead simply be a succession of choices for the delayed option. However, we would argue that an initial choice for a LD option is qualitatively different in at least two ways from any continued choices that might occur during a delay-to-reward period. The initial choice is essentially a statement of commitment on the part of the chooser to wait for the LD option, which is then taken to reflect greater subjective value for that option over the ISD option. Any continued choices during the delay-to-reward period would be different in that (a) the choice question itself would necessarily change to a choice about maintaining the original commitment, and (b) some delay would have elapsed. Unless something happens to specifically reduce the value of a LD option (e.g., it becomes uncertain), it would generally be maladaptive in terms of optimization to choose an ISD option (which had been continually available) after having invested in a LD option by waiting through a portion of its delay. However, such choices, or defections, clearly do occur as evinced from much DG research. In interpreting this failure to optimize, the question then becomes one of what would motivate such a choice under these conditions? Rachlin (2000) suggests that it might be a perception of increasing delay length to delivery of the LD option. However, for reasons already discussed, we would contend that ability to delay gratification also plays a determining role in any such choices during delay-to-reward periods. For example, willfully delaying gratification is consistent with observations of reduced DG times when the actual primary reinforcer is present (see above). Conversely, we would not expect having the reinforcer present to affect perception of remaining delay.
The feedback component of Figure 3 represents the learning involved in incorporating one's personal history with sustaining LD choices into future choice preferences when choosing between ISD and LD options. If an individual has a history of being unable to stick with or sustain choices for delayed rewards, then due to time-and energyexpenditure issues it would be highly disadvantageous to continue to value and choose delayed options as though sustaining such choices were not a problem. This type of personal history with delayed options should impact subsequent choice preferences for ISD and LD options, which, in turn, should also be reflected in choice performance on DD task procedures. This model does not directly address learning that may occu r as a result of initial choices for ISD options. However, learning from such choices may serve to establish a frame of reference for determining the relative subjective value of LD options.
From Figure 3 , a number of predictions and research questions arise. From a developmental perspective, correlations between DG and DD should be weaker for younger children than for older children. Such an age-related pattern would likely reflect the development and experiencerelated refinement of the feedback component of Figure 3 . Research is needed to improve measures of DG and DD in both children and adults to allow developmental research questions to be more fully explored.
In addition to developmental changes, however, the feedback aspect of Figure 3 leads to a somewhat counterintuitive prediction regarding an individual's choice preference and his or her ability to sustain choices for certain commodities. For commodities in which an individual finds it especially difficult to sustain LD choices, choice preference should be less for LD options involving that commodity. Put another way, for commodities that a person would have a particularly difficult time sustaining choices involving delay, that person should discount the value of that commodity more as a function of delay than commodities for which he or she does not find it as difficult to sustain choices. For example, given the characteristic nature of addiction, a person who smokes cigarettes chronically or who is addicted to heroin might be expected to have a more difficult time delaying gratification for cigarettes or heroin in real-world settings than for other commodities, like money. If this were true, the feedback loop of Figure 3 leads to the prediction that such individuals should discount the value of cigarettes or heroin more by delay than other "less intense" commodities not involving addiction. In keeping with this prediction, several researchers have shown that chronic cigarette smokers discount the value of cigarettes more by delay than comparable monetary rewards (Bickel et aI., 1999) , crack/cocainedependent participants discount crack/cocaine rewards more than comparable monetary rewards (Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003) , and individuals addicted to heroin discount the value of heroin more than monetary rewards (e.g., Madden, Bickel, & Jacobs, 1999 ). Odum and Rainaud (2003) also found that healthy non-addicted participants who reported liking beer and pizza discounted the value of these reinforcers (Le., hypothetical beer and pizza) more than they did monetary reinforcers, suggesting this differential discounting tendency is not restricted to just drugs of abuse.
These findings with specific substances of addiction, and consumable reinforcers more generally, are somewhat counterintuitive in that DO research with only monetary rewards has shown that people discount the value of larger amounts of money less than smaller amounts of money (e.g., Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2002) . This means the general tendency is to discount higher value commodities less than lower value commodities. Therefore, these findings involving commodities of addiction and food cannot logically be attributed to the participants valuing these commodities more than they valued the monetary rewards. Conversely, one could argue that these commodities may be valued less than the comparable amounts of money; however, this notion would be inconsistent with the nature of addiction and subjective value for the drug of addiction. A central aspect of the pathology surrounding addictive behavior is the apparent greater value the addicted person holds for a drug and its effects relative to almost anything else in his or her life.
Rather, as illustrated in Figure 3 , such DO findings are more consistent with the notion that these commodities are difficult to resist over time, which is then reflected in the observed differential rates of discounting.
Similarly, the finding of higher rates of discounting for beer and pizza compared to money might reflect commodity-related differences in ability to sustain choices for primary versus secondary reinforcers. Delay-ofgratification research showing shorter DG times when a primary reinforcer is present compared to having a symbolic representation of the re inforcer (see above) suggests this possibility, especially if hypothetical money can be considered more symbolic as a reinforcer than hypothetical beer or pizza.
Other research questions from Figure 3 primarily involve the extent of correlation between choice preferences and ability to sustain choices involving delay. A lack of correlation may lead individuals to make choices involving delayed consequences in a manner that is unrealistic, thus setting these individuals up for failure in terms of being able to follow through on decisions involving delayed benefits. In addition to age, a number of other factors may contribute to a lack of concordance between choice preference and ability to sustain choices. For example, IQ might be a determining factor involved in the relation between choice preference and ability to sustain choices, with greater intelligence expected to be associated with more correspondence between choice preferences and sustaining choices.
Another factor possibly influencing this relation might be certain pharmacological influences on ability to sustain choices that do not also influence actual choice preference. It stands to reason that if the contingency-evaluative processes measured by DD are partly the product learning history (as illustrated in Figure 3 ) that such processes should be more resistant to acute-type changes than the ability to sustain choices. From Figure 3 , changes in choice preference based on Feedback Processes would require historical experience with ability to sustain choices. For example, ethanol should be expected to influence performance on DG types of tasks in that ethanol has been shown to interfere with behavioral inhibition (e.g., Vogel-Sprott, Easdon, Fillmore, Finn, & Justus, 2001) , which is similar to resisting the temptation of immedia.te rewards for the DG procedure. However, in two studies examining the effects of ethanol on performance of a DO type of task there was no significant ethanol effect (Ortner, MacDonald, & Olmstead, 2003; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999) . Therefore, it can be expected that while under the influence of ethanol, the degree of correspondence between choice preference and ability to sustain choices for an individual may be reduced, thus leading such an individual to make choices that are unrealistic for him or her to sustain while under the influence. But, as would be predicted from Figure 3 , if the individual were to somehow remain under the influence of ethanol for an extended period, and during that time have experiences with a decreased ability to sustain choices involving delay, choice preference should eventually change in a manner to be consistent with his or her reduced ability to sustain choices.
As diagrammed in Figure 3 , individual differences in the extent of relatedness between choice preference and ability to sustain choices may be an important feature of impulsive behavior to consider, which is not possible when DG and DD are conceptualized as reflecting the same underlying processes. A lack of relatedness between these two aspects of impulsive behavior could lead to problems in choices being made which are ultimately untenable. For example, an individual might decide to lose weight or stop smoking cigarettes by drastically reducing caloric intake or quitting smoking cold turkey. In these instances, these decisions do not represent impulsive choice as defined by DD; however, as too often turns out to be the case, if the person is unable to sustain such a choice, then the choice is still problematic (and arguably impulsive) in that the person is less likely to lose weight or stop smoking than if a more individually realistic decision had been made. We contend that individual differences in the extent of relation between the processes measured by DG and DD is an aspect of behavior that warrants further attention in delay-related impulsivity research.
Concluding Comments
In the current paper, we discussed the DG and DD measurement procedures and what the underlying psychological processes are believed to be for each. Also, we put forth an argument for the position that DG and DD are not measures of the same or equivalent aspects of impulsive behavior. Rather, it is more consistent with what is known about DG and DD to view these procedures as measures of discrete, yet related, dimensions of impulsive behavior, that is, ability to sustain or stick with choices involving delay and choice preference, respectively. Further, a conceptual model was presented for the specific relation between the processes measured by DG and DD (Figure 3) . This model represents the processes of DG as more foundational and basic when compared to the processes of DD, which are comparatively more cognitive and learning mediated. This conceptualization of the relation between DG and DD is almost exactly opposite of what has been proposed in the one other published conceptualization of the relation between these two indices of impulsive behavior (Rachlin, 2000) .
From the presented model (Figure 3) , it becomes apparent that certain predictions and research questions emerge that would otherwise be lost without the current two-dimensional conceptualization of DG and DD, such as a lack of correspondence between choice preference and ability to sustain choices that may lead to problematic choice behavior. We believe that the research questions posed from the presented conceptualization warrant future attention in an effort to more fully understand delay-related impulsive behavior as it may pertain to choice behavior and ability to sustain choices.
